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                                                   Abstract  
          This paper reviews the literature on R&D to provide guidelines for recent efforts to 
include R&D in the national income accounts.  The main conclusions are: 
         1.   Measures of R&D as an asset held by a particular owner must be complemented 
by estimates of the spillover effect of R&D in order to obtain a reliable measure of the 
overall effect of R&D on productivity growth. 
         2.   If research financed by the government and research financed by business are 
both counted as investment, some double counting occurs and growth accounting analysis 
overstates the role of research relative to other factors. 
         3.  The overall rate of return to R&D is very large, perhaps 25 percent as a private 
return and a total of 65 percent for social returns.  However, these returns apply only to 
privately financed R&D in industry.  Returns to many forms of publicly financed R&D 
are near zero. 
         4.  Firm R&D should be allocated to the different industries in which a firm 
produces, rather than all credited to the firm’s main industry.  An allocation procedure is 
proposed. 
         5.  Much further work needs to be carried out to understand how R&D conducted in 
the richest countries is transmitted to developing countries.  Detailed microeconomic data 
on firms or establishments in developing nations will be necessary to understand the 
channels of technology transfer more fully. 
 
Journal of Economic Literature categories:  O30, O40. 
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paper are solely those of the author, and do not reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
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          Recent years have seen substantial progress towards including research and 
development (R&D) as a capital investment within the national income accounts 
(Canberra Group II (2003)).  Economists at the United States Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, or BEA, (Carson, Grimm and Moylan (1994), Fraumeni and Okubo (2005); 
Okubo et al (2006b)) have prepared initial versions of a potential R&D satellite account.  
The U.S. National Science Foundation has agreed to support BEA’s further work on 
R&D accounts, and the BEA is committed to publish R&D accounts for the United 
States.  Economists in Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics (2004)) and in the 
Netherlands (de Haan (2004)) have also reported initial R&D stocks for their countries. 
 
        One main motive for adding R&D is to broaden the accounts to include a 
further important source of economic growth.  Present international discussion has 
largely concentrated on treating R&D as an asset for private firms, the government, 
universities, and other nonprofit organizations.   However, most gains from R&D 
typically do not accrue to the original investors.  Benefits instead spill over to a wide 
variety of other economic agents.   Consequently, it is necessary to establish links 
between the role of R&D as an asset and the total effect of R&D on economic growth, 
which reflects both asset returns and spillovers. 
  
                                                 
2   The views expressed here are those of the author, and do not represent the Bureau of Labor Statistics.   3
      Many central characteristics of R&D stocks, such as the rate of depreciation, the lag 
until R&D becomes operative, and the rate of return, differ widely between the asset and 
spillover effects.  In a sense, analysts have to prepare two different sets of calculations to 
describe the asset and spillover effects of R&D.   From this perspective, the stocks of 
R&D assets the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis is currently preparing neatly 
complement the spillover R&D stocks which the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has 
published for many years.
3  Other countries currently measuring R&D assets will 
similarly have to expand their analyses to include spillovers in order to describe the full 
impact of R&D on productivity growth.  
 
      This paper examines the relationship between R&D as an asset and R&D as an 
ingredient in growth.  Section I considers recent measures of asset and spillover R&D 
stocks in the United States, and also examines which portions of R&D should be included 
in national R&D stocks.  Section II reviews the economics literature on the private and 
social (private plus spillover) impact of R&D.  Section III considers some difficulties 
associated with measuring R&D accurately in each industry.  Section IV examines the 
international transmission of R&D, a major source of spillovers for most of the countries 
in the world.  Section V concludes.
4 
  
I.   Introduction: Understanding Asset and Spillover Returns to R&D; What Portions of 
R&D Should be Included in National R&D Stocks? 
 
                                                 
3   Okubo et al (2006b) describe BEA work on R&D as an asset, and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1989) 
presents the BLS work on R&D spillovers.  
4   An earlier version of the present paper was prepared as a background paper for the Canberra II 
discussion of research and development.     4
        Most Canberra II group discussion of R&D concentrated on similarities between 
R&D and other assets already recognized as capital.
5  For example, firms commit 
resources to R&D in the hope that this investment will create an asset which eventually 
lead to greater profits, much as in the case of plant or equipment. 
 
     The comparison is valid, and supports the proposal that R&D expenditures should 
similarly be treated as capital investment.  However, R&D differs from other forms of 
capital investment in several respects.  A central characteristic is that payoffs from R&D 
are not limited to the original investors, but also accrue to competitors, other firms, 
suppliers, and customers.
6   Consequently, it is too narrow to view R&D as essentially an 
asset held by a particular owner.  A broader perspective on R&D has to include 
knowledge spillovers, which have often been a central theme in discussions of 
productivity growth.
7   
 
       To illustrate the importance of the diffusion of knowledge from firms undertaking 
research to the broader community, consider technical change in pharmaceuticals.  
Statins are a new class of anti-cholesterol drugs which have contributed greatly to the 
decline of heart disease.  A major pharmaceutical firm introduced the first commercial 
                                                 
5   The March 2004 meeting of the Canberra II group, held in Washington, discussed R&D as an asset, and 
concentrated on similarities between R&D and other assets. 
6    Romer (1990, pp. 73-76) discusses nonrival goods, for which the use by one firm or person does not 
limit its use by another.  Romer also considers excludability, and points out that the results from research 
can only partially be excluded from use by others.  
7    Section II reviews the literature on the effect of R&D on productivity growth. 
      In addition to the nonrival characteristic of R&D knowledge, it is typically difficult to determine the 
value of output from research because research results are typically not sold on the open market.  
Economists have measured research outcomes from statistical relationships between R&D and several 
indicators of technological success.  Most studies determine the return to research from its relationship with 
productivity growth.  Other work evaluates the effectiveness of research from its connection with profits or 
stock market value.     5
statin product in 1987, and conducted pioneering research demonstrating that statins were 
safe, lowered cholesterol, and successfully reduced the death rate from heart disease.  
Since 1987, several firms have introduced new and improved statins.  A different firm 
now produces a new and greatly improved statin, which lowers cholesterol more 
effectively, and has therefore become the market leader. 
   
      Although the second firm now dominates the market for statins, it is not the case that 
the second firm’s private investment in R&D is now the only relevant R&D.  From the 
point of view of private returns, much of the early research which the initial firm carried 
out is indeed no longer profitable.
8  However, in a broader sense all the initial research 
which demonstrated that statins were safe, highly effective, and reduced the incidence of 
heart disease still provides the core knowledge of the present day industry.  The first 
firm’s initial investment in R&D is still relevant to the industry and still provides 
important social returns, even though most of the private returns now go to the second 
firm.  
 
         To take another example, two leading firms have competed in producing 
microprocessors for many years.  When the technology leader introduces a new chip, the 
second firm soon matches, and prices fall rapidly.  As a result, microprocessor prices 
have declined sharply.  Most of the benefits of innovation have been captured by 
consumers through lower prices.  The profit of the innovators, obtained through returns to 
the R&D they conduct, is only a small part of the picture.   
 
                                                 
8     In fact, the initial drug, introduced in 1987, is no longer under patent.   6
        These examples illustrate how the knowledge and benefits obtained from R&D 
typically leak out from the original performers of R&D to competitors, to other firms, to 
consumers, and, eventually, to other countries.  Many forms of knowledge are useful to 
other firms (and so have a social return) even when they no longer pay off to the firm 
initiating the research (no longer have a private return).  Similarly, consumers obtain 
better or cheaper products (benefit from social returns) even if the private return to firms 
turns out to be low.
9 
 
       As knowledge gradually leaks out, private benefits decline and spillover effects 
increase.  Consequently, private and spillover returns follow different time paths.  Quite 
reasonably, spillover effects are considerably more long lived than private effects.  
Okubo et al. (2006b) calculate R&D asset stocks assuming a 15 percent (or greater) 
annual depreciation rate.  In contrast, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1989), measuring 
the longer lasting spillover effects, assumes 10 percent depreciation for applied research 
and development and zero depreciation for basic research, which implies an overall 
depreciation rate of less than 9 percent.
10 
 
       Such substantial differences in depreciation have an important impact on the implied 
size of R&D stocks and the time pattern of anticipated benefits.  For example, in 2000 the 
BLS spillover R&D stock is 44 percent greater than it would have been if calculated at 15 
percent depreciation.  A 15 percent depreciation rate implies that a quarter of an 
                                                 
9     Measured benefits are limited to those which have a market evaluation.  Some benefits, such as clean 
air or some types of medical advances, are not evaluated through market prices, and are typically not 
included in economic statistics.   
10     Since the BLS assumes zero depreciation of basic research, the basic research proportion of the overall 
BLS stocks is greater than data on annual R&D investments would suggest.   7
investment has depreciated after two years, half by five years, and three-quarters by 9 
years.  In contrast, 9 percent depreciation indicates a quarter of investment has 
depreciated by 4 years, half by 8 years, and three-quarters by 15 years.       
 
       The influence of depreciation is accentuated by differences in the lags with which 
R&D investment enters the R&D stock.  BEA R&D investments enter the asset stock 
immediately, whereas BLS investments enter the spillover stock with a lag of two years 
for applied research, and five years for basic research.
11  The longer lags further imply 
that spillovers occur later than asset returns. 
 
       There are also major differences in the returns to asset and spillover R&D.  
Somewhat surprisingly, it is quite difficult to determine exactly how much of R&D 
returns accrue through private returns and how much through spillovers.  Most of the 
economics literature typically reports the amount by which the average social return to 
R&D exceeds the private return.
12  Remarkably few studies (Schankerman (1981); Cuneo 
and Mairesse (1984)) actually examine the actual return to private firms, which is most 
relevant in considering R&D as an asset.  
 
                                                 
11      In the BEA stocks, if investment occurs in 1990, half enters the R&D stock at the start of 1990 and 
half at the start of 1991.  In the BLS calculations, 1990 investment in applied research enters the research 
stock at the start of 1992.   
12    Studies typically include the capital, labor, and other factors used in research within the inputs used to 
measure productivity growth.  Therefore, the private value of research is removed from such productivity 
measures.  Consequently, when R&D is used to explain productivity growth, the estimated return is the 
amount by which the return to R&D exceeds the private value of these resources.  Griliches and 
Lichtenberg (1984b, page 475) and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1989, page 36) provide a more formal 
statement of this argument.   
      In other relevant literature, Nordhaus (2004) emphasizes that only a very small portion of the returns to 
R&D accrues as abnormally high returns to the innovator.  Baumol (2000) describes how firms continually 
improve the quality of their products, through R&D, and leapfrog beyond the products produced by their 
competitors’ R&D; this churning process reduces the value of their competitors’ private R&D.   8
         Nevertheless, the existing literature generally finds that spillovers are greater than 
private returns.   Griliches (2000, page page 70) concludes that the excess return to 
firms
13 is 10 percent, whereas the social return, which includes private returns, is 25 
percent.  Section II of the present paper reviews the evidence and suggests the private 
return to R&D is 25 percent, while the social return is 65 percent.  Okubo et al. (2006a, 
page 27) examine many different studies, and conclude that the private return is 26 
percent and the social return 66 percent.  Each of these three judgements indicates 
spillovers contribute approximately three-fifths of the total return to R&D. 
 
        Of course, the conclusion that spillover effects are primary is necessarily tentative 
because the available evidence is incomplete.  Clearly, most studies do not include the 
private value of resources used in research, and thereby understate the contribution of 
R&D.
14  Studies of specific innovations offer an alternative method of measuring actual 
returns to private firms; subsection II.5 below examines evidence from the innovation 
studies and reaches roughly similar conclusions concerning the relative importance of 
private and spillover effects.  In addition, most studies omit the international effects of 
R&D (Coe and Helpman (1995)) and thereby miss an important element of spillovers. 
 
       Another central question in the capitalization of R&D is which portions of R&D 
should be included as investment.  The current consensus is that all private, government, 
                                                 
13     Footnote 10 explains why the R&D literature typically reports excess returns which exceed the private 
return. 
14     Since most studies report only a portion of total returns to R&D (the excess return), the implied total 
effect of R&D will clearly be greater if the value of the private inputs used in R&D is also included.  
         In this context, a BEA analysis of industry data (Schultz (2006)) has the great virtue that it isolates the 
capital, labor, and materials used in R&D and removes these inputs from the factors used in production.  If 
similar adjustments could be made within firm data, it would be possible to obtain better estimates of actual 
overall returns to each firm’s private R&D.   9
or university R&D should be treated as investment.
15  However, two issues arise here.  
First, many forms of R&D have little economic value and do not contribute to growth.  
Should they all be counted as investment?  Second, if publicly financed basic research 
and subsequent private research are both treated as investment, a certain amount of 
double counting occurs.  The rest of Section I examines these two topics. 
 
        In considering which forms of R&D should be designated as investment, the asset 
and growth views of R&D once again offer contrasting perspectives.  The 1993 System 
of National Accounts defines an asset, in part, by requiring that “Economic benefits may 
be derived by their owners by holding them or using them over a period of time”.  In this 
definition, the word “may” leads to an extremely broad definition of assets.  Even if a 
broad category of research spending brings almost no demonstrated economic returns, 
just the possibility that a very small portion of these expenditures “may” be able to bring 
returns leads to the entire sum being classified as an asset.  So it is not surprising that 
current discussion suggests that all R&D expenditures by firms, universities, and 
governments (as R&D is defined in the OECD Frascati Manual) should be treated as 
investment.   
 
       In contrast, from the point of view of growth, what matters is the proportion of an 
expenditure category which can be expected to provide returns and the magnitude of the 
returns.  From this perspective, most discussion has emphasized privately financed 
research, which has been amply demonstrated to bring high returns.  Of course, as 
Scherer (1999) pointed out, most private R&D projects do not actually earn positive 
                                                 
15   Canberra II group (2006); Robbins (2006); Okubo et al (2006b).    10
returns.  Nevertheless, all private R&D expenditures can plausibly be treated as 
investment because these expenditures are all undertaken with the expectation of a 
commercial return and “may” obtain such returns. 
 
          In contrast, broad slices of university and government research are conducted with 
very little expectation or prospects of direct commercial returns.
16  For example, only a 
very small part of the research conducted by universities and colleges brings commercial 
returns.
17  As President Richard Levin of Yale University recently remarked “We’re not 
trying to drive university science by commercial objectives.  We want to do great science.  
Some of that will have commercial potential; most of it won’t.”  Also “Our technology 
transfer strategy is not to maximize revenue.  Our primary goal is to get the findings of 
our laboratories out into practice.”
18   
 
      Federally financed industrial research accounted for more than half of industrial 
research in the late 1960s, though this proportion is now less than one tenth.  Evidence on 
the productivity impact of federal research in industry is mixed.  The industry studies and 
the best study of firm data (Leonard (1971); Terleckyj (1974); Lichtenberg and Siegel 
                                                 
16   Fraumeni and Okubo (2005) assume the return to public research is two-thirds of the return to private 
research, which is clearly an overstatement because they are working within the framework of the current 
national income accounts, which do not include the returns to federal investment in R&D within output. 
      More recently, government statisticians have decided to include returns to government capital as output, 
and it is clearly appropriate to include returns to government R&D stocks as well.  Nevertheless, as the text 
points out, many forms of federal and university research have little economic value and do not contribute 
to growth.  Even though such expenditures are classified as R&D, I would argue that, because there is no 
evidence of a positive return, such expenditures are actually a form of government consumption, often for 
quite useful purposes, but do not deserve to be treated as investment. 
17   Even universities as eminent as Michigan, Rochester, and Yale earn surprisingly small amounts from 
patent royalties.  For example, over the last decade Yale earned approximately $21 million dollars a year 
from patent royalties  
18   Yale Alumni Bulletin, November 2006.   11
(1991)) conclude federal research in industry does not improve industrial productivity.
19  
In contrast, Griliches (1986) concluded federal R&D in industry had a positive effect on 
productivity, though less of an impact than privately financed research.  Even beyond 
university and federally financed industrial research, Piekarz (1983) reviews evidence 
indicating that many federally funded research programs have not been very effective. 
 
         It is disturbing to assign investment status to broad categories of research spending, 
such as university research or federally financed R&D in industry, when the fundamental 
evidence indicates that, though returns “may” exist, actual returns are unlikely or at best 
accrue to only a small proportion of expenditures.  In my judgement, large batches of 
expenditures where direct economic value is unlikely should not be treated as R&D 
investment, on the same basis as private R&D, merely on the off chance that some small 
amounts of these expenditures “may” turn out to have economic value.
20  If all 
expenditures in government and university R&D are treated as investment, the true 
                                                 
19   In the United States, federally financed research expenditures refer to research financed by the national, 
or federal, government.  On the basis of the type of evidence summarized in the text, the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (1989), in its work on productivity growth, chose to include only privately financed R&D 
conducted in industry in its measures of the relevant R&D stock. 
     Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991) is the best study of these matters within firm data because their paper 
adjusts the firm output deflators to reflect the different industries in which each firm actually produces.     
     Some papers find that federally financed research in industry has a positive effect.  Bonte (2003) argues 
that federally financed research contributes to productivity growth in the United States, but his analysis is 
based on a cointegration analysis of aggregate data, and does not use the highly detailed firm data analyzed 
in Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991).   
     A potentially important recent study (Guellec and van Pottelsberge de la Potterie (2004)) argued that 
government research expenditures, given private R&D, contribute to the rate of economic growth.  This 
analysis is based on aggregate data for 16 OECD countries.  Such conclusions run counter to most of the 
literature, which indicates that public research affects measured growth only through its effect on private 
research (OECD (2003) in addition to the U.S. studies mentioned in the text).  Without more detailed 
microeconomic evidence establishing specific channels through which public science affects productivity 
growth in these 16 countries (such as a more rapid growth of high-tech industries), the direct importance of 
government R&D in growth remains an open question.  
20    Consider a similar argument in the case of an auto dealer who is selling 100 cars, of which one or two 
“may” be used as an investment.  In this context, it does not make much sense to consider all 100 cars as 
investment.  Yet this is fundamentally what is being proposed in designating all university and government 
research as investment.   12
amount of relevant R&D investment is greatly overstated.
21  In my judgement, any 
procedure which counts all government or university research as equivalent, on a dollar 
for dollar basis, to private research spending provides an extremely flawed measure of 
how much economically relevant research investment actually occurs.   
 
         Of course, some government and university research has been greatly successful. 
Several programs, especially those in which university scientists compete for grants, such 
as the National Science Foundation, the National Institues of Health, some Department of 
Agriculture programs, and DARPA in the Department of Defense, appear to have a 
remarkable record.  In addition, much federal and university research is conducted on 
health care, and Nordhaus (2003) demonstrated the importance of such work.  Similarly, 
much military research substantially improved military effectiveness, as any comparison 
of the accuracy of precision guided missiles in the Gulf War of the early 1990s and in the 
Iraq war of the early 2000s clearly indicates.   
 
        However, these government successes have been influential primarily through their 
impact outside the public sector.  For example, when physicists developed better methods 
of transmitting their papers through ARPANET, this precursor to the Internet did not 
greatly affect government output. Except for some elements of military research, each of 
                                                 
21    As an illustration of the importance of properly defining the boundaries of research investment, in 
Lisbon the European Union adopted a goal that R&D expenditures should be three percent of GDP.  Private 
R&D expenditures are falling far short of this target.  The Europeans may therefore consider greater 
“investment” in university or government R&D.  I would argue that the economic returns to public R&D 
are far lower than those to private R&D and that, if the Europeans follow such a strategy, they will be badly 
disappointed with the returns.   Overall returns for university and government research are low primarily 
because so much research in these fields has no direct financial payoff.                 13
these major successes has probably had its greatest economic impact through the private 
sector.     
 
       The discussion above demonstrated much university and federal research has little 
commercial value.  On the other hand, perhaps federal R&D produces more government 
output, and should therefore perhaps be assigned a rate of return, such as the Treasury bill 
rate.  Such suggestions are inherently plausibile.  Perhaps R&D is effective in a variety of 
circumstances, and brings government agencies useful benefits, even if these are 
currently not included in GDP.  However, proposals such as these determine which R&D 
is useful by assumption rather than through evidence.  If the crucial contribution of 
federal R&D to growth is through increasing government output, advocates of including 
federally financed R&D, and its returns, in the accounts need to demonstrate that federal 
R&D actually brings about increased federal output.
22   Lehr and Lichtenberg (1998) 
showed it is possible to determine how new technology improves the productivity of 
government agencies.  If this channel is crucial in justifying federal R&D as an 
investment, we need much better evidence on how federally financed R&D improves 
federal productivity, and on whether there are important areas in which federal R&D is 
ineffective, before federally financed R&D, and its assumed returns, can be included in 
the national accounts. 
 
                                                 
22   As Section II below illustrates, the notion that private R&D contributes to growth is supported by a rich 
variety of evidence which greatly clarifies the returns to private R&D.  If evidence did not consistently 
show that private R&D affects productivity and output growth, the international statistical community 
would probably not now be supporting the inclusion of private R&D as an investment.  Surely, it is just as 
necessary to have sound empirical evidence demonstrating that there are returns to federal R&D before 
such expenditures are included as an asset.   14
       It is not sufficient to finesse these points by simply assigning a lower rate of return to 
all university and federal research.  The more fundamental problem is that many forms of 
research, however worthy they may be, do not deserve to be designated as investment 
because they do not contribute to the future growth of output. 
 
       Of course, many advances arising from university or government research eventually 
have an important indirect effect on growth.  Consider, however, the usual conventions 
and methods of growth accounting.  Growth accounting typically examines only the 
proximate sources of growth.  For example, growth due to a higher number of educated 
workers is typically attributed to labor quality, and growth due to larger amounts of 
capital is similarly attributed to capital formation.  Even if improvements in technology 
are the fundamental underlying cause, which creates the demand for a more educated 
work force or creates the new equipment which makes further capital deepening feasible, 
growth accounting still attributes these observed output gains to education and to capital 
deepening rather than to technology.  In a similar way, the flow of understanding from 
federal or university research typically operates by increasing the demand for private 
R&D.  If the National Institutes of Health develop new insights into the treatment of a 
particular disease, large amounts of further private R&D are usually required to convert 
these new ideas into new pharmaceuticals (Toole (2007)).  Consistent with the treatment 
of other inputs in growth accounting, growth accounting should include only the private 
R&D and not the underlying public or university research which makes the private effort 
feasible.  If we count both the underlying government and university research and also   15
the proximate private R&D spending, we are in a sense double counting the investment in 
R&D in comparison with our treatment of other inputs.
23 
 
         There may be some argument for double counting in the case of military 
technology, where improved weapons directly meet an important government goal, and 
the spillovers involved in dual-use technology are peripheral.  However, for other 
government research, in such areas as health, science, technology, and agriculture, the 
fundamental government goals are downstream, such as the introduction of better 
medicines or the promotion of industrial growth and technology.
24  In the context of 
growth accounting, it is not appropriate to include here both the public research which 
establishes understanding and the private research which implements the new concepts.   
 
         In summary, if we are operating within the framework of growth accounting, only a 
relatively small proportion, perhaps a quarter or less, of the R&D conducted in 
government or in universities can be expected to have commercial returns or to bring 
firmly established imputed returns.  Such a proportion is sharply lower than the two-
thirds suggested by Fraumeni and Okubo (2005).
25 
                                                 
23    Recent empirical studies have established that certain broad economic features, such as legal 
protections for private property (Scully (1988), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003)) or the presence of a large financial sector (King 
and Levine (1993)), have a positive impact on growth.  In much the same way, high quality government or 
university research is likely to create a favorable framework for growth.  Nevertheless, economists 
typically do not treat government expenditures on the legal or financial system as an investment.  
      In contrast, government investment in transportation infrastructure, where benefits can plausibly be 
assigned to individual firms, is often included in productivity studies.     
24   Some may argue that the government is really trying to advance science and knowledge for its own 
sake, which is a useful goal.  However, if the process did not eventually lead to better treatment for diseases 
and a longer life span, funding for NIH would be much lower. 
25   As some readers have suggested, by this logic if a research team in a medical school is hired to do 
similar work in a pharmaceutical firm, such a change in the work environment will increase measured   16
    
II. The Literature on the Rate of Return to R&D. 
     The effect of R&D on the economy depends on both what expenditures are included 
in R&D, as discussed in Section I, and what the returns to R&D are.  Section II therefore 
reviews evidence on the returns to R&D.  The rate of return to R&D can be examined at 
many different levels of aggregation, such as the returns to individual research projects, 
the returns to firms, returns to an industry, returns to a national economy, or even returns 
within the entire world.     
 
 
II.1  Private (Firm Level) Returns to R&D. 
 
         The return to research has generally been estimated (Griliches (1980)) by 
comparing productivity growth or profitability in different firms with research 
expenditures or the growth of the research stock within these firms.
26  Nadiri (1993, 
Table 1a) reports the results from many studies which examined the return to R&D 
within data for individual firms.   
 
         Several difficulties limit the validity of estimates of the private return to R&D.  
Substantial complementary resources are often used with R&D.  For example, the results 
from new research have to be put into effective operation.  In many cases, producing a 
new product requires a pilot plant or other new methods of production.  This requires 
                                                                                                                                                 
national investment.   The counterargument is that the firm presumably selects this research team, out of 
many available at the med school, because their work is atypical and has the greatest commercial potential. 
26  Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991) report estimates of the return to R&D based on productivity data for U.S. 
firms.  The Lichtenberg-Siegel estimates are based upon a large sample of firms and greatly improved 
estimates of firm productivity.  Griliches (2000, pp. 65-66) summarizes some of the main results 
concerning the stock market’s evaluation of firm’s R&D efforts.  Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) show 
that highly cited patents strongly affect stock market evaluation, but less cited patents have little impact.    17
substantial engineering work.  In addition to the capital costs involved, managers and 
workers will have to be trained in the new techniques.  Similarly, new products typically 
require very close coordination with marketing specialists.  The potential market has to 
be evaluated, and salesmen have to be hired and trained to sell the new product.
27   The 
high returns firms apparently earn on research expenditures may partially reflect returns 
to such complementary investments.   
 
         In addition, returns to private firms may be high because they include a substantial 
risk premium.  Mansfield et al. (1971) and Scherer (1999) show R&D projects have 
considerable technical and commercial risk and many projects are not very successful.  
Observed returns to R&D could, in part, reflect a substantial risk premium.   
 
         Nelson (1988) raised several important issues which should make analysts quite 
careful about accepting and using typical estimates of the rate of return to R&D.  Nelson 
points out that R&D and technological opportunity are closely intertwined.  Firms with 
high R&D typically have more favorable technological opportunities.  Similarly, firms 
with low R&D are likely to face weaker technological opportunities.  Consequently, it is 
difficult to determine the extent to which effects attributed to R&D expenditures actually 
reflect the collateral technological opportunities.  For this reason, Nelson argues that 
standard regressions, across firms or industries, cannot provide plausible estimates of the 
rate of return to research investments.
28,29   
                                                 
27   Mansfield et al. (1971, pp. 112-114) describes the many different types of additional inputs which are 
also necessary in the process of innovation. 
28  Griliches (1979, Section 5) also warned about simultaneity problems arising from the mutual 
dependency between R&D investments and past and future expected output.  Olley and Pakes (1996)   18
 
 
II.2   Industry (Direct) Returns to R&D. 
 
       Studies of the direct return to research examine the relationship between R&D and 
productivity within data for different industries.  By examining industry data, analysts are 
able to include spillovers between the different firms within an industry. 
 
        There are important differences between firm and industry returns to R&D.
30  As 
Griliches (1979, page 101) remarks, firm knowledge leaks out fairly rapidly, so firm 
R&D depreciates rapidly.  On the other hand, much of this knowledge is gained by other 
firms, so social returns depreciate more slowly than firm returns.  Similarly, there is a 
greater lag before social returns take effect, and social returns are substantially greater 
than private returns.  Consequently, many of the central features of R&D stocks are 
                                                                                                                                                 
suggest an important method of addressing such concerns about simultaneity, but do not apply their 
procedure to R&D.  Acharya and Keller (2007) usefully apply some of the Olley-Pakes ideas to R&D.  
Such methods are important because they provide estimates of the return to R&D which are much less 
subject to the problem of endogeneity. 
29  If R&D is thought to reflect some other influence, the standard econometric procedure would be to 
attempt to find an instrumental variable which influences R&D growth but is independent of the 
productivity of R&D.  Barro (1998, p. 20) comments “R&D spending may respond to exogenous changes 
in productivity growth so that the estimated coefficient on the R&D variable would proxy partly for 
exogenous technological progress.  Satisfactory instrumental variables to avoid this problem may not be 
available.”  Few studies have estimated the return to R&D using instrumental variables; Jaffe (1986) is 
perhaps the major exception.  Lewbel (1997) uses instrumental variables in a study of the effect of R&D on 
patents. 
     Fung (2004) measures intraindustry and intrafirm spillovers from patent citations, and includes 
measures of the overlap in patent citations and the scope (number of patent classes involved in a firm’ 
research) of patents.  He finds several of these influences are significant in explaining the effectiveness of 
R&D.  Furthermore, allowing for technological opportunity generally increases estimates of the R&D 
elasticity.  Fung also considers some of the relationships between his data and the technological 
characteristics of industries.  Any progress in this direction is very welcome, but a more fundamental 
understanding of how industry characteristics affect R&D patterns in a broad group of industries is 
necessary before we can understand why technological opportunities differ so widely among industries.  
Klevorick, Levin, Nelson, and Winter (1995) take an interesting initial step in this direction. 
30  Many R&D deflators (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1989); Okubo et al. (2006b)) combine labor costs 
and output price indices, which permits R&D deflators to rise less rapidly than input costs, reflecting 
increases in productivity.  However, Griliches (1990) and especially Kortum (1997) show that over time 
greater amounts of research are necessary to generate a new patent.  Though there are valid questions 
concerning the use of patents as a measure of research output and how the economic meaning of a patent 
has changed over time, this evidence suggests that the productivity of R&D does not increase over time.     19
sharply different in industry data than in firm data.  If satellite accounts for R&D are to 
include the economic impact of spillovers, the key channel through which R&D affects 
productivity and output growth, national income accountants will have to move beyond 
asset effects to examine spillovers, using alternative values to measure central concepts 
such as depreciation, lags, and the rate of return.
31 
 
       Considerable evidence describes leakage of R&D from firms to the broader industry.  
Mansfield (1985) showed information about new technology leaks out to rival firms 
within a year or two.  Caballero and Jaffe (1993) similarly find rapid leakage.  Jaffe 
(1986) found the pool of nearby research affected technological progress (the number of 
patents) more strongly than it affects private returns (the profits or market value of 
firms).
32   
 
          Nelson’s argument that R&D reflects the presence of collateral technological 
opportunities applies with particular force at the industry level, where major differences 
in technological possibilities are most visible.  For example, no one would reasonably 
                                                 
31    Though spillovers are important within an industry, many spillovers of course take place in a broader 
context, to other industries, within a national economy, or internationally. 
      In practice, it is often difficult to determine the rate of depreciation and the lag until research becomes 
effective.  For example, a detailed study of 133 firms (Griliches and Mairesse (1984)), which was designed 
to examine the effects of various ways of defining and measuring physical and R&D capital (p. 347), was 
not able to establish definitive estimates of the depreciation rate and the lag (pp. 372-373). 
     Market share structure also affects the difference between firm and industry results.  Blundell, Griffith, 
and Van Reenen (1999) show firms with higher market share tend to have a greater number of innovations 
and patents, and the effect of innovation on stock market value is greater for when firms with larger market 
share.  Such results show firms with larger market share are able to appropriate a larger proportion of the 
industry gains to R&D.  
32   Baumol (2000) emphasizes that the different firms within an industry often use R&D to compete on the 
basis of product quality, and that the cumulative nature of progress ensures that product quality improves 
greatly over time.  As Sena (2004, p. F314) summarizes Baumol’s argument, “spillovers and voluntary 
dissemination allow technological knowledge to spread in the economy so as to increase productivity of 
other firms and this way guarantee the continuous growth and improvement in living standards Western 
economies have experienced in the last two centuries.”       20
expect productivity growth to become as rapid in lumber as it is in computers if R&D 
intensity in lumber were raised to the levels prevalent for computers.  Yet, that is what 
the usual cross-industry regressions assume.    Nelson recommended that the return to 
research should be determined not from regressions across firms or industries, but instead 
from careful study of the returns to individual innovations.  Subsection II.5 examines 
rates of return obtained from innovation studies. 
 
 
II.3  Estimates of Indirect Returns to R&D  –  Downstream Analyses of R&D. 
 
        The notion of complementary investments has been important for a long time in the 
understanding of indirect returns to R&D.  For example, it has long been the case that, 
when a new computer is introduced, the purchasing firm must deploy considerable 
resources to use the new equipment effectively.  Bresnahan and Greenstein (1996) 
describe such complementary investments as coinvention, and Bresnahan (1999) 
emphasized firms must adjust their organizational structure and their work processes, 
which is a long and slow procedure, to take full advantage of the new technologies. 
 
         In recent years, economists have begun to pay far more attention to the idea that 
new technology requires very substantial complementary investments.  Brynjolfsson, 
Hitt, and Yang (2002) argue that such complementary investments are very large.  They  
show that financial markets valued a dollar’s worth of computer capital as ten dollars.  
Other kinds of investments do not have such large effects in the financial markets.  The 
authors argue that the great effect which computers have on firm financial value occurs 
because large complementary investments, in such areas as software, organizational   21
redesign, and worker training, are typically made together with the purchase of 
computers.  As they point out, such adjustments eventually extend to many fundamental 
characteristics of the firm, such as the extent of centralization or decentralization of 
decisions, patterns of work flow, work compensation and incentive patterns, relationships 
with customers and suppliers, and even corporate culture.  Expenditures on improving 
business practices of this type are typically expensed.  As Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang 
(2002) argue, if expenditures in these areas increase substantially with computer 
spending, and are a source of unmeasured investment and value to the firm, then the 
observed increase in firm value with computers can provide an estimate of the associate 
increased investment in intangibles.  Bresnahan (1999) also provides a very useful 
discussion of the ways in which organizations have to restructure in order to use new 
technology more effectively.  Finally, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) have recently 
reported that the observed “return” to computer investments, at the firm level, grows 
steadily over time, which they interpret as ever increasing investment in complementary 
assets.
33   
 
      The clear importance of complementary assets makes it far more difficult to 
determine the appropriate rate of return to R&D.  If downstream complementary 
investment is substantial, it becomes very difficult to determine how much of the 
                                                 
33   Bloom, Sudun, and Van Reenan (2006) provide important support for the idea that corporate knowledge 
of information technology applications is central by showing that, in Great Britain, U.S. multinationals are 
more productive than non-U.S.multinationals or domestic firms, and that these productivity advantages are  
associated with higher returns to information technology.  Furthermore, these high returns to information 
technology are greatest in sectors such as trade and finance where the U.S. productivity advantage over 
Europe, as measured within industry data, has grown most rapidly,   22
observed downstream returns are attributable to indirect R&D and how much is due to 
the many different forms of complementary investment.   
 
Does indirect R&D reflect the presence of measurement error 
 
       Griliches has pointed out (Griliches (1992)) that observed indirect returns to R&D 
could represent either measurement error or true spillovers, which are ideas borrowed by 
one research team from another.
34  In practice, as many authors have pointed out, the line 
between measurement error in prices and genuine technology transfer is difficult to 
distinguish.  For example, when an aircraft manufacturer prepares a new plane, they 
consult carefully with customers, adapt the plans so as to ensure consumer satisfaction, 
and spend considerable resources on training airlines to use the new aircraft.  All these 
mechanisms create genuine technology transfer.  When statisticians create a price for 
aircraft, no matter how detailed the specification for an airplane is, such detailed 
characteristics of a sales package are not likely to be included.  A single transaction can 
therefore represent both technology transfer and measurement error in prices. 
  
        Nevertheless, there is important evidence that a lot of the indirect returns to R&D 
reflect measurement error.  Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984a) present a model in which 
errors in the price of equipment or the price of materials are related to the R&D intensity 
of the sector supplying these goods; the underlying logic of their model implies that the 
indirect effects of R&D primarily represent measurement error.  In addition, Gordon 
(1990) demonstrated that equipment prices for highly research intensive capital goods 
                                                 
34   Measurement error occurs if the price of output, in an industry such as computers, does not fully reflect 
improvements in the quality of output.  The purchaser then obtains greater quality benefits than the 
measures of price suggest.   23
contain substantial measurement error.  More recently, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and 
Krusell (1997) argued that a declining relative price of equipment, heavily influenced by 
Gordon’s estimates of the quality-corrected price of equipment, has been an important 
ingredient in growth.   
 
      If observed spillovers associated with indirect R&D primarily reflect measurement 
error in prices rather than the transmission of ideas, these returns cannot be used as a 
contributor to productivity growth and as a source of output growth.  As Jorgenson 
(1966) showed long ago, if a correction is made to increase the growth of output in a 
poorly measured capital goods sector, this adjustment will increase output and multifactor 
growth, but the corresponding increase in higher quality capital input, purchased by 
customers, will reduce multifactor productivity.  The two effects roughly offset each 
other, and there is little net effect on multifactor productivity growth.  It is therefore an 
important issue whether the spillovers associated with indirect R&D reflect only 
measurement error.  In the likely instance in which a large proportion of indirect R&D 
spillovers reflect measurement error, this portion of the spillover cannot be used to 
explain multifactor productivity growth.  When Fraumeni-Okubo (2005, Table 1) include 
indirect rates of return in their estimates of the overall return to R&D, they implicitly 
assume that none of the spillovers associated with estimates of the social return to R&D 
reflect measurement error, which is not likely to be correct (Gordon (1990)).  Their 
reference to the possibility of measurement error (footnote 9) does not sufficiently warn 
the reader that, if measurement error is important, most of the estimates of the indirect 
return to R&D should not be used to help determine the overall return to R&D.    24
 
       In view of these considerations, estimates of indirect returns are subject to important 
limitations.  Heavy downstream complementary investments distort the picture, and there 
is evidence of considerable measurement error, which implies that any substantial net 
effect on productivity is questionable.  In view of these difficulties, one has to be 
extremely careful about adopting estimates of the rate of return to R&D which rely 
heavily on estimated indirect returns.   
 
 
II.4.  The Spillover of Ideas. 
 
        Early work on R&D concentrated on the returns to firms and industries.  However, 
more recently, spurred by comments in Griliches (1979; 1992), attention shifted towards 
true spillovers of ideas.  Many studies have used detailed information from patent records 
to trace the evolution of ideas.  
    
      Jaffe (1986; 1988) examined the effects of knowledge spillovers between firms, 
where intrafirm spillovers depended on the similarity of firm’s patent portfolios.  Not 
surprisingly, the spillover of nearby R&D had a greater impact on technical progress, as 
measured by patents, than on profits or stock market value.  Verspagen (1997a; 1997b) 
and Frantzen (2002) used detailed information from patent records to describe knowledge 
spillovers between countries and industries.
35   
                                                 
35   These studies examine the effect of R&D in the domestic industry, R&D in related industries, foreign 
R&D in the same industry, and foreign R&D in associated industries.  Though an overall R&D effect is 
clear, the more detailed measures often face collinearity difficulties (Verspagen (1997b).  
      In other work, Park (2004) examines international and intersectoral spillovers of R&D, and 
concentrates on spillovers to production outside manufacturing, an important issue which deserves further 
consideration.  Moretti (2004) examines human capital spillovers within metropolitan areas using several 
measures of technical connection between different industries obtained from the R&D literature.  He finds   25
 
      Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002) carried out extremely comprehensive work which 
provides detailed information on each individual U.S. patent from 1963 to 1999.   Their 
work emphasizes the forward citations gained by each patent.
36  In conjunction with 
evidence from Trajtenberg (1990), Harhoff, Narin, Scherer, and Vopel (1999), and 
especially from Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005), this line of work shows how 
important forward citations are.
37 
 
       Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002) include a diskette, which makes their detailed data on 
United States patents easily accessible.  Their generosity in making these data available 
has already led to a broad literature (Peri (2005); AlAzzawi (2004)) which has begun to 
make important contributions to a variety of issues.
38  Somewhat fortuitously for the 
purposes of the present discussion, the release of the Jaffe-Trajtenberg data provides an 




      Though much of the literature on spillovers concentrates on spillovers across 
industries or countries, work has also begun to examine spillovers in many other 
                                                                                                                                                 
input-output connections and Jaffe’s measure of the similarity between industry technologies work better 
than interindustry patent citations. 
36   Forward citations are citations a patent earns in the future.  Backward citations are citations a patent 
application makes to prior work. 
37   Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) consider the relative importance of several indicators of patent 
quality, including forward cites, backward cites, and the number of claims made in each patent.  All three 
of these effects have some importance. 
38  Almeida (2004) analyzes highly detailed information on the identity of individuals who have filed 
important patents to study the effect of labor mobility on technical change. Almeida’s work on individual 
inventors illustrates the rich potential of the more detailed information included in each patent. 
39   The availability of the Jaffe-Trajtenberg data is an example of within industry spillover, if the relevant 
industry is defined to be economic research.  Clearly, the importance of within industry spillovers depends 
on the definition of an industry.   26
circumstances.  Jaffe, Fogarty, and Banks (1998) studied how research carried out by 
NASA spilled over to industry.  Adams, Chiang and Jensen (2003) examined how 
research conducted in Federal research laboratories, which accounts for 14 percent of 
total United States research expenditures, spilled over to private firms.  Building on 
Mansfield (1995), Adams (2004) investigated how research conducted in specific 
university departments affected industrial users.  Darby and Zucker (2003) described how 
star scientists have been influential in transferring ideas to biotechnology firms.
40  It is 
useful to understand the transfer of ideas through all these different types of linkages.  
These articles show that, beyond the firm to firm transfers that comprise the core of the 
R&D literature, substantial technology is also transferred from government or 
universities to private firms. 
 
 
IV.5  Evidence on Private and Social Returns from Studies of Individual Innovations. 
 
       In view of the difficulties associated with estimates of direct and indirect returns 
(Subsections IV.2 and IV.3 above), it is tempting to follow Nelson (1988) and obtain 
private and social returns to R&D from studies of individual innovations.  The major 
article which examines individual innovations is Mansfield et al. (1977). 
 
       There are two problems with relying on Mansfield’s results.  First, the study included 
only 17 innovations.  However, the National Science Foundation soon replicated 
Mansfield’s work (Tewksbury, Crandall, and Crane (1980); Nathan Associates (1978)).  
The three studies together consider 57 innovations.   
 
                                                 
40   See also Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong (1998).   27
      Second, Mansfield et al. (1977) emphasize the median rate of return to individual 
research projects (25 percent private returns and 56 percent social returns).  If one is 
interested in the return to a typical scientific project, the median rate of return is relevant.  
However, to understand the effect of R&D on productivity and output growth, the mean 
project return is relevant.  As Scherer (1999, Chapter 5) shows, most research projects are 
not particularly successful, but a few very large successes drive total returns.  If one looks 
only at median returns, the very large effects which the most successful projects have on 
output and productivity growth will be missed.  
 
           In all 57 innovations, the median private return to research is estimated to be 28 
percent, and the median social return is 71 percent.  This information suggests social 
returns exceed private returns by 43 percent.  The three innovation studies include 7 
observations where the private return is negative, and 5 where social returns are negative.  
The studies do not report specific losses for failing innovations.  Assuming negative 
returns are losses of 50 percent, average private returns are 32 percent, and average social 
returns, boosted by 11 innovations where the reported social return is greater than 150 
percent, are 87 percent.
41   
 
       There is one potential problem with these innovation data.  Scherer (1999) showed 
most innovations are typically not profitable.  However, the private rate of return was 
negative for only 7 of the 57 innovations.  The low incidence of negative returns suggests 
that the innovations considered may not be representative. 
                                                 
41   Social returns of the magnitudes mentioned in this paragraph imply that private returns represent 
considerably less than half of the total social return.   28
 
       In summary, Mohnen (1996, p. 50) concluded, based on a broad overview of the 
R&D literature, that “On average, the social return to R&D exceeds the private return by 
50 to 100 per cent.”  The innovation studies provide important further evidence that 
social returns are very large and exceed private returns by a substantial margin.
42      
 
 
IV.6 The Fraumeni-Okubo Summary of Evidence on the Rate of Return to R&D. 
 
        Fraumeni and Okubo (2005, Table 1) recently selected nine studies to determine the 
rate of return to privately funded R&D.     
 
Table 1.    Evidence on the Rate of Return to Private R&D.  (from Fraumeni and Okubo) 
 
      Author (year)                  Private return                              Social return    
 
Sveikauskas (1981)                     7-25 %                                          50 % 
Bernstein-Nadiri (1988)             10-27                                          11-111 
Bernstein-Nadiri (1991)             15-28                                          20-110 
Nadiri (1993)                              20-30                                             50 
Mansfield (1977)                          25  (median)                                56  (median) 
Goto-Suzuki (1989)                      26                                                80 
Terleckyj (1974)                           29                                             48-78 
Scherer (1982, 1984)                  29-43                                         64-147 
 
 
      Five of the nine papers (Sveikauskas (1981), Goto-Suzuki (1989), Terleckyj (1974), 
and Scherer (1982, 1984)) are industry studies, and report the return to research 
conducted “Within” the industry and the return to R&D  “From Outside”, that is R&D 
carried out by other industries.
43  Although some text (Goto and Suzuki (1989, p. 561) 
                                                 
42  Wolff (1997) concludes the social return is 53 percent and the private return is about 10 to 12.5 percent, 
which also implies social returns exceed private returns by 40 percent. 
43 Section III of Goto-Suzuki reports estimates of the private return to firms, but Sections IV and V of their 
paper, which deal with social returns, are based on industry data.   29
interprets these coefficients as private and social returns, “private” returns here reflect 
industry returns, not firm returns.  Industry returns correspond to firm returns only if 
there are no spillovers within an industry.
44   
 
         Bernstein and Nadiri’s (1988, 1991) work is slightly different.  They analyze 
industry data, but remove the capital (1988, page 431) and labor and materials (1991, 
page 37) used in research from the BLS or NIPA factor inputs typically used to study 
U.S. productivity.  By making this adjustment, they are able to estimate total returns to 
R&D rather than just R&D spillovers.
45  However, the coefficients they estimate at the 
industry level show the sum of the private return to the firm undertaking R&D investment 
plus spillovers to other firms in the industry.  These returns are not the same as “private 
returns”, the total returns to an individual firm undertaking research, as described in 
Mansfield et al.  (1977). 
 
                                                 
44 Fraumeni and Okubo (2005, Table 1) list the private and social returns to R&D reported in these studies.  
They attribute the numbers to a Council of Economic Advisers file, which no longer exists on the Web.  
Joseph Stiglitz, then Chairman of the Council, distributed a handout based on this file during a talk in 
Washington.  Fraumeni and Okubo report the Council’s summary accurately.  However, the columns of the 
Council table were not properly labeled.  As discussed in the text, only Mansfield et al. (1977) reports a 
private rate of return, in the traditional sense of the total returns to a private firm.  Some of the ambiguity 
comes from Griliches (1992, Table 1, part II), which combines information on the private and social return 
to R&D with parallel information on the direct and indirect return within a single table.  The text of that 
paper (page S43) comments that the estimated social rates of return look surprisingly uniform, but does not 
emphasize that many of the rates of return reported in the left column of Table 1 (listed as Within and From 
Outside, respectively) include elements of social returns (the within industry spillover, and the excess 
return, which exceeds the costs of R&D) and does not represent the traditional private return to firms.  
(Griliches (2000, pp. 60, 61, and 70) shows returns to R&D are considerably greater in industry data than in 
firm data.) 
45   Current BEA work on R&D (Schultz (2006)) now removes factor expenditures on R&D from factor 
inputs, using recently expanded NSF data on the composition of research costs in each industry.  This  
important advance permits BEA to estimate the total return to research, rather than just the spillover 
component of returns.  For a discussion of why standard procedures estimate only the spillover effect see 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1989, page 36).   30
        Nadiri (1993) summarizes results from many different studies, on both a firm and 
industry basis.  The only study on the Fraumeni-Okubo list which actually estimates 
private and social returns is Mansfield et al. (1977), which is fundamentally different 
because it measures the return to individual innovations rather than firm and industry 
regressions.  Except for Mansfield, the studies cited do not provide information on the 
private and social rates of return to R&D.   
 
       In view of these many difficulties, what R&D expenditures should be included as 
investment and what rate of return should be attributed to them?  First, in industry, all 
privately financed research should clearly be counted as investment.  However, the 
evidence indicates federally financed research in industry, on net, does not have a 
positive return, so such expenditures probably do not qualify as investment.  Second, 
because of the issues of relevance to growth and double counting discussed in Section I, 
only a small proportion of the research financed by government or universities should be 
classified as investment. 
 
        Third, the studies Fraumeni-Okubo (2005) list in their Table 1 are far too heavily 
weighted towards industry studies of direct and indirect returns.  Such estimates depend 
much too heavily on indirect returns to R&D, which are unreliable because they depend 
on the amount of complementary investment, and at least partially reflect measurement 
error, so that the estimated indirect effects are probably not a genuine effect on 
productivity.  Fourth, because of the many difficulties with the regression estimates it is 
probably useful to emphasize rates of return obtained from the innovation studies, which   31
also indicate that social returns are very large and considerably exceed private returns.  
On balance, private returns of 25 percent and social returns of about 65 percent, which 
more than double the private return, seem reasonable.  However, these extremely high 
returns are relevant only for privately financed research.    
 
 
III.   R&D Stocks on an Industry Basis. 
  
       In the growth accounting literature, residual income, which remains after all other 
factors of production are compensated, is generally attributed to capital.  The standard 
treatment of capital in growth accounting, due to Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), first 
removes payments to labor and materials from income, and then, using the Hall-
Jorgenson (1967) procedure, assigns the sum which remains, property income, to specific 
capital assets.  These procedures first allow for depreciation, taxes, and other costs of 
capital, and then allocate the rest of capital income to the internal rate of return, or capital 
profit. 
 
       Much evidence suggests that observed profit income is not just a return to capital, but 
also reflects returns to research and development and other intangible assets.  For 
example, Grabowski and Mueller (1978) examine a sample of 86 firms which conduct at 
least some R&D.  They report (p. 342) the overall variance in profit rates was reduced 
approximately in half when R&D was capitalized rather than expensed.  They conclude 
that the after-tax return to R&D is between 15 and 20 percent, considerably above the 
rate of return earned on other assets, but comparable to the returns reported in Mansfield   32
et al. (1977).  The Grabowski and Mueller study clearly shows that some of the income 
typically included in the return to capital actually represents a return to R&D. 
 
      Recently, economists have discussed investments in many types of intangibles which 
extend far beyond R&D.  Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2003) estimate that expenditures 
on intangibles in the United States were $1221 billion, annually, in the United States 
from 1998 to 2000.  R&D expenditures, as defined by the National Science Foundation, 
were $185 billion, or only about 15 percent of the total.  Investments in knowledge in 
other areas, such as finance, movies, and books, which the NSF does not count as 
research because they are not based on an explicit scientific or technological field, were 
estimated to be $199 billion.
46  Among other items, computer software accounted for 
$154 billion, advertising for $254 billion, employee training for $123 billion, and 
management improvement for $306 billion.  R&D accounts for only a small share of the 
amount firms spent, beyond capital expenditures, to increase future output.
47   
 
       The Multifactor Productivity program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics currently 
includes plant, equipment, inventories, land, and software as capital assets, and calculates 
the internal rate of return, service price, and income paid for each asset.  A separate 
internal rate of return and industry-specific asset service prices are calculated for 56 
                                                 
46   The National Science Foundation publication Research and Development in Industry does not include 
R&D in the social sciences or psychology, so research in financial economics does not appear in these data. 
47   Many of the assets Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2003) consider depreciate considerably more rapidly 
than tangible capital and R&D, so the proposed new items account for a smaller proportion of the overall 
capital stock than these figures on investment indicate.    33
different industries.  If R&D is to be treated as an investment, it would be natural to 
expand the BLS calculations, on an industry basis, to include R&D as a further asset.
48  
 
        Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine the relevant R&D stock within each 
industry in the United States.  As Scherer (2003) discusses, in the U.S. most data on R&D 
are collected at the firm level.  Many large firms invest substantial sums in R&D.  
However, these firms frequently operate in many different industries, and it is not clear 
how much of each firm’s total research portfolio supports production in any particular 
industry.
49  As an illustration of the difficulties involved, Wolfe (2003) reports the U.S. 
National Science Foundation assigns large amounts of R&D to the trade industry, even 
though relatively little research actually takes place in trade.  The problem occurs because 
all research conducted by a firm is assigned to the one industry in which its payroll is 
greatest.  If a pharmaceutical firm has many sales representatives, its research efforts 
could well be assigned to trade, even though all the research actually takes place in 
pharmaceuticals.   
 
         Because these procedures assign all research conducted by a firm to a single 
industry, current National Science Foundation data are not accurate enough to create a 
reliable measure of R&D stocks within each of the BLS industries.
50  In my judgement, it 
                                                 
48    The BLS calculates a separate internal rate of return for each of 56 industries included in the nonfarm 
private business sector.   To extend these calculations to R&D requires R&D stocks for each of these 56 
industries.   
49    Brown, Plewes, and Gerstein (2004) discuss the limitations of available measures of R&D in specific 
industries in considerable detail. 
50   The Bureau of Economic Analysis faces similar issues in establishing industry R&D stocks.  Carson, 
Grimm, and Moylan (1994), and much of the rest of the R&D literature, has used the existing NSF data on 
industry R&D expenditures to create industry R&D stocks.    34
is necessary to modify the NSF data on industry R&D expenditures considerably before 
they can provide a sound measure of R&D assets in each industry.   
 
        A potential method of assigning R&D spending conducted by individual firms to 
specific industries could follow the well-established procedures which the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis currently uses to allocate profits earned by firms to specific 
industries.  The BEA takes Internal Revenue Service measures of the profits earned by 
firms classified in each industry, and allocates these profits to establishments in particular 
industries on the basis of data showing the industries in which these firms actually 
employ workers, as determined from the Enterprise Statistics.   
 
           Similar procedures are likely to improve the accuracy of measures of the R&D 
actually committed to each industry.  A separate allocation can be conducted for every 
firm, allocating that firm’s research in proportion to its own industry distribution of 
employment or payroll.  Furthermore, firm R&D could be assigned to particular 
industries not only on the basis of employment or payroll, but also on the basis of the 
intensity of scientific and technical employment within each industry.  Through such a 
methodology, trade, where scientific input is typically low, would for that reason be 
assigned less of a firm’s research than pharmaceuticals, where scientific input is typically 
high.
51  A simple allocation procedure of this type is likely to provide better estimates of 
                                                 
51    As an example, each firm’s proportion of its work force in a given industry, si, could be multiplied by 
the proportion of technological employment in that industry in general, ti.  Then, that firm’s R&D 
expenditures could be allocated to specific industries in proportion to siti as a share of the firm’s total siti 
across all i industries.  If R&D is allocated by payroll, in the second stage industry totals would have to be 
adjusted to reflect the technological employment/payroll or technological payroll/payroll ratios.   
      In a slightly different, but probably preferable, methodology, each firm’s research expenditures can be 
regressed on its payroll in each relevant industry.  The resulting industry coefficients then provide an   35
the R&D actually occurring in each industry than those obtained by assigning each firm’s 
R&D solely to one industry.  Furthermore, since a large number of firms contribute to 
production in any given industry, the proposed alternative procedure is less likely to have 
problems with disclosure limitations.
52  The procedures proposed here would probably 
make it possible to publish R&D estimates for a larger number of industries, which 
would help overcome one of the major limitations of current NSF industry R&D data.
53 
  
         Once the distribution of R&D across industries is better understood, more reliable 
information on the industries in which R&D actually occurs can in turn be used to 
determine the industries in which R&D is actually utilized.  The literature (Scherer (1982, 
1984); Verspagen (1997a; 1997b); Moretti (2004)) has used input-out relationships, 
information from patent applications, and careful analysis of individual patents to 
determine the specific industries in which R&D spillovers occur.   
 
       The Bureau of Labor Statistics currently uses an interesting framework to understand 
the role of R&D spillovers in the aggregate economy.  Spillovers do not provide income 
to any particular asset, and are not included within the data on factor inputs and factor 
earnings which determine the portion of growth attributable to specific inputs.   Instead, 
aggregate spillovers are included “below the line”, as one of the determinants of observed 
                                                                                                                                                 
estimate of research intensity in each industry.  It would be of interest to examine how closely such 
industry coefficients match actual measures of scientific or technical employment in each industry.  The 
procedure suggested in the present paragraph determines research intensity in each industry from a 
statistical procedure, rather than by assumption, and utilizes the highly detailed data available for each firm.  
Because more data are utilized, this variant of the methodology seems likely to provide estimates of 
research intensity for a larger number of industries.   
52   For example, if each firm produces output in five industries, the data cell for a typical industry would 
contain information from five times as many firms. 
53    I plan to construct and analyze alternative measures of industry R&D, prepared along the lines 
discussed above.   36
multifactor productivity growth.  Such procedures are helpful in evaluating the role of 
spillovers in national data.  However, further information on the industry distribution of 
spillovers is necessary to extend this approach to specific industries. 
 
IV.   International R&D Spillovers. 
 
        As evidence presented below indicates, even for the United States, a very large and 
highly advanced economy, foreign R&D plays an important role in technical progress.  
Most of the other countries in the world, which are much smaller and less technically 
progressive, are far more dependent on foreign R&D.  Consequently, most of the 
statistical agencies in the world will have to understand and evaluate how foreign R&D 
affects their economies in order to include the full effect of R&D in their accounts. 
 
          R&D is heavily concentrated in a few developed countries, essentially in the 
OECD.
54  Even within the OECD, a few relatively large countries, like Germany, Japan, 
and the U.S., account for a large proportion of R&D.
55  Once R&D is included in the 
national income accounts, economists will have to provide the underlying information on 
how R&D in the leading countries affects production in small rich countries or in the 
developing world.   
 
                                                 
54   The OECD countries had a particularly large share of world R&D in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.  
However, in very recent years R&D has increased sharply in several countries outside the OECD, notably 
China and India. 
55   For example, in 1995 the United States, Japan, and Germany accounted for more than two-thirds of 
OECD R&D expenditures, and the G7 countries together accounted for about 85 percent of the total.  Data 
are from the OECD Science, Technology, and Industry Scoreboard: 2003.   37
          There are many potential channels through which the undoubted technological 
advantages of the most advanced countries can be transmitted to less wealthy nations.  
One branch of the literature emphasizes the mere presence of international trade (Coe and 
Helpman (1995)).  Other analyses emphasize the presence of multinational companies 
(Gorg and Strobl (2001)) or the role of foreign domestic investment (Borensztein, De 
Gregorio, and Lee (1998), Aitken and Harrison (1999)).
56  The transmission of ideas 
(AlAzzawi (2004)), through such mechanisms as the scientific or technological 
literatures, is another potentially important pathway.  Of course, in actual practice many 
or all of these potential channels of transmission are likely to be influential.  Much work 
still remains to be done to sort out how these potential influences interact and to 
understand the particular circumstances under which each is important.
57 
 
      Even among rich countries, there is a distinction between the largest countries, such 
as the U.S., Germany, and Japan, which conduct large amounts of research, and small 
countries which perform much less research.  Within the research leaders, spillovers 
within an industry and across industries tend to be very important.  In smaller countries, 
many of the equivalent effects come into existence through foreign trade spillovers.
58 
 
                                                 
56   Although much of the literature concentrates on whether technology from multinationals spills over to 
domestic production, multinationals of course make a contribution if they produce at a higher level of 
productivity than domestic firms. 
57   Recent studies have begun to investigate links between different facets of technology transfer.  For 
example, AlAzzawi (2004) examines the extent to which spillovers of knowledge, as measured by patent 
citations, are associated with foreign domestic investment.  Branstetter (2000) examines whether Japanese 
investment in the United States is a channel of knowledge spillovers to Japanese firms. 
58   Tables 4 and 5 of Coe and Helpman (1995) support the statements made in this paragraph.  As in most 
estimates of this type, spillovers from the U.S., Germany, and Japan are larger than those from other 
countries.  Coe-Helpman also find domestic R&D is more important than foreign R&D in large countries, 
but foreign R&D is more important than domestic R&D in most small countries.   38
       One branch of the empirical literature examines research spillovers among advanced 
(OECD) nations.  Coe and Helpman (1995) emphasize the volume of foreign trade as a 
key to research spillovers. Their work also includes imports as a proportion of GDP, 
which permits technology transfer to vary with the importance of trade.  In later work, 
Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberge de la Potterie (1998) suggest a better measure of R&D 
flows, and Funk (2001) and Kao et al. (1999) clarify the econometric issues involved.  
Despite these improvements, Coe-Helpman (1995) remains the classic article which 
demonstrates the potential importance of international R&D spillovers. 
 
        Xu and Wang (1999) is a particularly useful study of R&D spillovers within the 
OECD.  They show R&D in capital goods affects productivity growth, but R&D 
contained in other forms of trade does not.  Xu-Wang include domestic R&D stocks as 
well as a proxy for the extent of the disembodied flow of information (a distance 
weighted, or unweighted, measure of other countries R&D stocks) in addition to the 
R&D contained in capital goods.  The broad range of variables allows them to determine 
the importance of R&D transmitted through each of these channels. Xu and Wang (1999) 
is one of the most insightful and helpful contributions in the literature because they report 
estimates of returns obtained through each mechanism.
59 
  
                                                 
59    Verspagen (1997b) similarly concludes that R&D spillovers embodied in purchased inputs and 
knowledge floating freely across international borders both play a role in technology transfer across 
countries.  Like Xu and Wang (1999), Verspagen (1997b) shows R&D spillovers from the large technology 
leaders have the greatest impact on other nations. 
       Griffith, Redding, and Van Reenen (2004) integrate R&D with international technological 
convergence.  They demonstrate that, in additional to the usual R&D effect (observed at the industry level), 
there is convergence (in the sense that country-industry observations at a lower level of productivity tend to 
catch up), and that R&D permits the successful absorption of foreign technology.   Keller (2002) studies 
R&D spillovers from the largest countries to smaller OECD nations.     39
       Another strand of the literature considers R&D transfers to countries outside the 
OECD, typically developing nations which conduct very little R&D.  Coe, Helpman, and 
Hoffmaister (1997) is the original contribution in this direction.  Schiff, Wang, and 
Olarreaga (2002) and Connolly (2003) conduct more recent work.  Schiff, Wang, and 
Olarreaga (2002) find R&D imported in capital or materials from Northern countries 
increases productivity in Southern industries, especially in R&D intensive industries.     
 
       Many studies of technology transmission to developing countries (Borensztein, De 
Gregorio, and Lee (1998); Connolly (2003)) examine data for the aggregate economy.  
More information could be brought into play if economists constructed more reliable 
measures of industry productivity growth in different countries.
60   
 
        The effect of technology transfer on developing countries will eventually have to be 
understood on the basis of highly detailed information on firms and establishments.  
Muendler (2004) recently studied the type of information which is needed.
61  His work on 
                                                 
60    Two recent studies illustrate both the potential of international comparisons based on detailed industry 
data and the need for better measures of productivity.  Savvides and Zachariadis (2004) examine the effects 
of research contained in foreign capital goods, the amount of capital goods imports, and foreign investment 
on productivity growth in manufacturing.  However, economy wide deflators, rather than data specific to 
manufacturing, are used to measure real ouput.  Similarly, Schiff, Wang and Olarreaga (2002) examine 
how R&D imports affect productivity growth in 16 manufacturing industries in 25 developing countries.  
Output data are expressed in U.S. dollars and deflated by the U.S. GDP deflator.  It is questionable whether 
this procedure generates productivity measures which are as reliable as studies which use industry specific 
output price deflators for each country. 
       The International Comparisons of Output and Productivity (ICOP) project at the University of 
Groningen has, for many years, measured international productivity differences based on detailed 
information on unit values in different countries.    
61    Hallak and Levinsohn (2004) similarly recommend the use of highly detailed micro data, rather than 
aggregate country data, in the analysis of the closely related issue of whether increased amounts of foreign 
trade bring a positive effect to the growth rate.  As in the present review, they recommend greater emphasis 
on the analysis of, and discrimination between, the many different channels through which growth effects 
may operate.  Hallak-Levinsohn also argue that different channels are likely to be influential in different 
circumstances.   A recent review (Keller (2004)) also emphasizes the need for detailed data, as well as the 
usefulness of case study evidence.   40
productivity in Brazilian firms included measures of the foreign equipment and materials 
available to each firm.  He concluded foreign import competition was more important 
than foreign technology.
62  If further work, especially with detailed establishment data on 
other countries, confirms these results, technology may be less important than previous 
discussion has suggested.  In that event, greater weight will have to be attached to 
product market competition, as emphasized in Parente and Prescott (1994; 1999) and 
Lewis (2004).   It is worthwhile to be reminded that technology transfer can be much 
more effective when other economic conditions are supportive.
63  
 
       On balance, there is widespread international transmission of knowledge associated 
both with the imports of R&D-intensive capital equipment (Xu and Wang (1999), Coe, 
Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1997), and Caselli and Wilson (2004)) as well as R&D 
included in materials as well as capital equipment (Schiff, Wang and Olarreaga (2002)).  
This international transmission of R&D typically has a favorable effect on productivity 
growth.  One interesting study finds strong benefits associated with R&D intensive 
materials (Lichtenberg and Virabhak (2002)). 
                                                                                                                                                 
       In addition to Muendler (2004), several further studies examine detailed data on production in 
developing nations.  Basant and Fikkert (1996) analyze panel data for Indian firms between 1974 and 1982.  
India appears to be a developing country in which many firms conduct their own R&D.  They emphasize 
foreign purchases of technology, as well as the impact of domestic R&D, and construct a foreign R&D 
spillover measure by weighting R&D in eight wealthy economies by each country’s relevance to India, as 
determined by patents granted in India.  
       In a production function study, Bartel and Harrison (2005) compare the productivity of public sector 
and private sector production in Indonesia.  Among other topics, they consider the effect which foreign 
ownership has on productivity.  Blalock and Veloso (2006) examine the effect of imports on productivity in 
Indonesian data.  All this work illustrates the usefulness of highly detailed datasets describing productivity 
growth over time.  See also Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2007) for the United Kingdom.  
62    In further evidence supporting the Parente-Prescott and Lewis view, Schiff and Wang (2004) show that, 
in North-South trade, openness to trade, as measured by the amount of trade, has a greater impact on 
productivity growth than the knowledge (R&D) content of a unit of trade does.              
63    Some scholars emphasize countries gradually have to develop the capacity to use modern technology.  
Nelson and Pack (1999) present such a viewpoint, and compare the results with growth accounting.     41
 
         There is also substantial transmission of knowledge not specifically associated with 
factor inputs (Xu and Wang (1999)).  Such disembodied knowledge flows are often 
highly localized (Peri (2005), Maursith and Verspagen (2002)).  The importance of 
distance may change greatly over short periods of time (Keller (2002)).  
 
      A large advanced economy such as the U.S. generates most of its own technical 
progress.  Foreign R&D could be most influential if it allowed U.S. research to improve 
more rapidly.  However, it is difficult to evaluate the importance of foreign ideas.  As 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1989, page 6) remarked: 
“A further issue is whether foreign research investment should be included.  Clearly, as 
foreign technological levels have approached U.S. levels and as American multinational 
corporations have conducted more research abroad, foreign R&D has become more 
relevant to U.S. firms.  However, the relative weight to be attached to a unit of foreign 
research and how this may have changed over time are unclear.” 
 
      Data on patent citations now make it possible to determine the relative importance of 
foreign research, and how this changes over time.   Consider all U.S. patents granted to 
inventors located in the United States.  Such patents arguably provide a good description 
of U.S. technical progress each year.  Table 2 shows how often these U.S. patents cite 
U.S. and foreign research.
64  
                                                 
64     I thank Anastasiya Osborne for programming the large data bases containing these patent data.   
         If one looks only at citations of foreign work patented in the U.S., it is necessary to examine how 
much foreign research is patented in the U.S., and how this proportion changes over time (Eaton and 
Kortum (1996; 1999)).  However, the data reported in the text include all citations made by U.S. patents, 
regardless of whether the cited patents are U.S. or foreign.  If each citation made by a U.S. patent is 
assumed to be of equal value, a simple count of the domestic or foreign origin of citations provides direct 
information on the relative importance of domestic and foreign research.  Because large numbers of 
citations are observed each year, differences in the importance of individual citations should cancel out.  
       The available data report the country of cited patents only for patents granted in 1963 or later.  We 
estimate the country origin for patents granted prior to 1963 on the basis of time trends in later years.  It is   42
 
Table 2 Citations of Foreign Patents, in Proportion to Citations of U.S. Patents 1976-2000   
                                     (for utility patents, year refers to year of application) 
 
1976      .301         1981     .366          1986    .435          1991    .490          1996    .505 
1977      .314         1982     .389          1987    .447          1992    .503          1997    .510 
1978      .327         1983     .399          1988    .455          1993    .510          1998    .497 
1979      .338         1984     .405          1989    .470          1994    .521          1999    .506 
1980      .356         1985     .426          1990    .473          1995    .552          2000    .525 
 
Source: computed from files of individual patents, as provided by the U.S. Government 
Patent and Trademark Office. 
 
        These data suggest that in 1976, in addition to knowledge obtained from U.S. R&D, 
the United States had access to 30 percent further knowledge from foreign research.
65  By 
2000, the increment of foreign knowledge increased to 53 percent.    
 
         U.S. productivity growth accelerated sharply in the late 1990’s, and the productivity 
recovery was sharper in the U.S. than abroad.  Table 2 shows the proportion of citations 
of U.S. work declined steadily from 1976 to 1995, but this trend then reversed.  Patent 
citations suggest U.S. technology turned a central corner in 1995; the timing is 
remarkably similar to the year in which U.S. productivity growth accelerated.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
important not to omit cited patents occurring before 1963, which are overwhelmingly of U.S. origin.  Early 
versions of this paper reported a greater proportion of foreign citations, because citations to patents 
occurring prior to 1963 were not yet included. 
65     These calculations assume that each citation, whether domestic or foreign, contributes the same 
amount of knowledge to U.S. innovation.  The proportion of foreign citations is greater than found in many 
other studies because citations of patents granted outside the U.S are included.  For example, in 1976 there 
were 34984 citations of U.S. patents granted to foreign inventors, and 17370 further citations of foreign 
patents.            43
       If we assume foreign R&D increased U.S. effective R&D stocks by the ratios given 
in Table 2, and foreign knowledge earned the same 30 percent rate of return, foreign 
R&D contributed 0.1 percent a year to 1947-2002 U.S. productivity growth.
66  
 
       A major unresolved question is what happens to returns to R&D in the U.S. and other 
advanced countries as further nations, such as China and India, expand their capability to 
do R&D.  So far, most studies conclude R&D in one country increases productivity in 
other countries.  However, Luintel and Khan (2004) report foreign R&D reduces 
productivity in the United States.  The effect of international competition in technology 





V.  Conclusions. 
 
      Recent decisions to include research and development expenditures in the System of 
National Accounts raise important new questions for statisticians in developed and 
developing countries.  Many of the benefits of R&D are not obtained by the original 
investors, but instead leak out to other firms, customers and even other nations.  Because 
the asset and spillover influences of R&D have different time horizons, it is useful to 
establish separate “national R&D stocks” for each purpose. 
                                                 
66    Under these assumptions, the 1948-2002 R&D effect increases from .17 percent a year (with the usual 
BLS estimates based on just domestic R&D) to .24 percent   Since information on the country of origin of 
citations is available only for 1976 and subsequent years, the productivity calculations mentioned above 
estimate the foreign percent of citations for years prior to 1976.  Since information on foreign citations is 
more reliable for 1973-2002, we mention that, in these years, the domestic R&D contribution of .18 percent 
a year to productivity growth increased to .29 percent a year when foreign R&D is taken into account.  
Foreign R&D is important, of course, due to the rapid growth of foreign citations, as reflected in Table 2.   
67    Hall concludes  (1993, page 317) that greater competition, much of it foreign, reduced the U.S. private 
return to R&D in the 1980’s, but had less of an impact on social returns to R&D.  As R&D increased in 
other countries, the United States perhaps lost some monopoly power over innovation (Freeman (2005)). 
68     In developing countries, technology typically adopts and modifies advances created in the wealthy 
nations, so information on innovations, such as patents, provides a less complete picture of new technology.   44
 
     On the basis of the evidence considered, privately financed R&D in industry should be 
treated as an investment and included in the relevant R&D stock.  Returns to R&D are 
very high, but these high returns accrue only to privately financed R&D.  Many elements 
of university and government research have very low returns, overwhelmingly contribute 
to economic growth only indirectly, if at all, and do not belong in investment. 
 
      Much remains to be understood about the specific pathways through which R&D in 
advanced nations is transmitted to developing countries.  There are many potential 
pathways through which this knowledge may spread.  Once R&D is included in the 
accounts, economists will hopefully pay much more attention to understanding exactly 
which channels are effective in transmitting knowledge to poorer countries. 
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